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In this paperI develop a model for small and medium enterprises’ external financing. I concentrate 
on a situation where a firm offering trade credit to his customer applies for a credit at a bank. The 
effect of a defaulting customer on the borrowing capacity of the supplier has not yet been covered 
by the litterature. In a contract theroretical more generaly, in a game theoretical framework, there 
is an informational asymmetry between the lender and the borrower on the credit worthyness of 
the entrepreneur. In this model, the informational asymmetry leads to moral hazard which results 
in credit rationing.An optimal contract considering also a possibly defaulting customer generates 
additional credit rationing. The paper develops two subcases: in the first one the borrower has 
informational advantage on his customer compared to the creditor, in the second there is not any 
informatioanl advantage related to the customer. The results show an informational paradox, the 
informational advantage of the borrower reduces the volume of credit he can receive, while the 
informational symmetry leads to a higher borrowing capacity.The model decribes a typical situ-
ation on the Hungarian market. Banks provide a low volume of credit to SME because the firms’s 
financial statements and their relationship with their customers is not opac. So the informational 
disadvantage induces the bank to offer a low level of credit even if the net present value of the 
financed projects is highly positive. 
In this paper I examine the external financing of firms who provided trade credit to their 
customers. Trade credit is a widespread phenomenon. All time when a customer pays 
only after the delivery of the product, the supplier offered trade credit to him. 
Disregarded from trade credit, external financing of firms takes place in an asymmetric 
informational situation where informational asymmetry applies to the firm’s the future 
ability and willingness to pay. Also moral hazard is considered by the financer because 
the creditor can not be certain of the firm’s commitment to a successful project. As a 
consequence, even projects with positive net present value (NPV) receive less external 
financing than the optimal level, if they receive funding at all. The phenomenon is called 
credit rationing. (Tirole, 2005)
In this paper I will demonstrate that taking trade credit into consideration, credit ration-
ing increases. In a contract theoretical framework, based on the external financing model 
of Tirole (2005), I develop two alternative models. In the first version, the entrepreneur 
is informed about his customer’s default before the bank, while in the second version, 
the entrepreneur and the financer learns about delayed payments at the same time. The 
results show a paradox situation. In the first case the credit rationing is higher than in the 
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second one. So the informational advantage of the borrower on his own customer can not 
be converted to higher borrowing capacity. To increase the level of external financing, the 
borrower should share all the information he has on his customers with the bank.
The paper organizes as follows. After reviewing the literature in Section 1, I develop the 
two versions of the model in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the results while Section 4 
concludes.
Theoretical background
In the topic of corporate credit contracts, the paper is based on the theoretical results of 
Fudenberg–Tirole [1990], Rajan [1992], Hart–Moore [1998], Holmström–Tirole [2000] 
and Tirole (2005). The first trade credit models are related to Schwartz [1974] and Myers 
[1977]. But several authors concentrate on the differences between trade credit and credit 
offered by banks, and explain the parallel existence of the two forms of financial interme-
diation. (Brennan–Maksimovic–Zechner [1988], Petersen–Rajan [1994], Long–Malitz–
Ravid [1994], Mian–Smith [1992], Petersen–Rajan [1997], Biais–Gollier [1997])
Empirical studies are available on the external financing of French (Ziane, 2003), German 
(Harhoff–Körting [1998]), Russian (Cook, 1999) small and medium seize enterprises 
(SME), and also on financing of SME in the U.S. Bakker–Klapper–Udell [2004] analysed 
SME financing in the Eastern-European region, Barlett-Bukvic (2001) concentrated on 
Slovenian SME, while Papp (2008) published his results on the Hungarian SME sector. 
In the U.S, 16% of SME external financing is coming from the suppliers in the form of 
trade credit. The maturity of trade credit differs in a wide range, but the ex post collec-
tion period of these receivables became drastically longer in many European countries 
after the financial crises. According to Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) in the UK, 
receivables are collected often 60 – 125 days after the original due date. (FSB, 2009)
The results of Bartlett and Bukvic can provide an illustration for the Eastern-European 
region. Their survey shows that late payments are general in the Slovenian SME sector, 
nearly 50% of the firms mentioned overdue receivables as one of their important prob-
lems. In Hungary, according to the Institute of Economic and Enterprise Research (GVI), 
36,5% of customers pays later than contracted, and 38,9% of the total sales revenue is 
collected after the due date. (Makó–Gyűrű–Papp [2009]).
Late payer customers often contaminate partner firms by contributing to delays on suppli-
ers’ own payables. In Hungary, 41,9% of firms decides to delay the pay out of suppliers if 
their own customers do so. (Makó–Gyűrű–Papp [2009]). While an important proportion 
of SME are kept in queuing trade credit chains, lack of external financing is also a sever 
problem in the sector. This double difficulty motivated my research on borrowing capac-
ity of firms offering trade credit to their customers. 183
The model of external financing in the case of defaulting 
customer
In this section I develop a new version of Tirole’s (2005) model for external financ-
ing. I incorporate a defaulting customer using three parameters into this game theoretical 
framework. The probability of collection on time is denoted by q, where c is the propor-
tion of the customer in the supplier’s balance sheet. The model allows a macroeconomic, 
systematic shock affecting both entrepreneurs, and reducing their probability of success 
by δ, where 0 < δ ≤ 1. The two versions of my model differ only in the following as-
sumption. First, I assume that the maturity of trade credit is shorter than that of the bank 
loan, so a default of customer is already known for the supplier during the lifetime of his 
credit contract. The bank has to face partly the business risk of its borrower and also the 
related credit risk, where these two risk types lead to moral hazard. Here, an additional 
moral hazard appears as the borrower has informational advantage not only on his efforts 
to repay the loan but also on his customer’s possible default. The second version of the 
model defines equal maturities for the trade credit and the bank loan. 
The model of external financing with relative informational 
advantage of the supplier
In this model there are three participants, the bank, the customer, and the supplier. The 
entire model is described from the point of view of the last one. The supplier has a project 
of seize I ∈ [0, ∞). This variable seized initial investment yields a constant R revenue on 
one unit investment. So in the case of success, a total revenue of RI is generated, which 
scenario has a probability of p, and the revenue is zero otherwise, which event occurs at 
a probability of (1-p). The entrepreneur’s liability is limited in the sense that he can not 
lose more than his initial investment. 
The revenue of the project is subject to moral hazard because the supplier can decide 
on the level of his own efforts which also defines the probability of a successful project. 
The probability of success is pH if the entrepreneur „behaves”, where „behaving” means 
that the entrepreneur is working on the project with high efforts. But if the entrepreneur 
„misbehaves” or „shirks”, the probability of success is pL, which is lower than pH. The 
term „misbehaving” describes a strategy where the borrower is using the assets for his 
own purposes and not the generate project revenues the highest possible. In the case of 
misbehaving, the entrepreneur will have a private benefit of seize B per unit of invest-
ment, which can be explained as the spared efforts or the gains of the private use of the 
firm’s assets and infrastructure.
I assume that the project has a positive NPV if the supplier behaves. As the R revenue on 
one unit of investment is constant, it is worth to reach the highest volume possible of I. 
At the beginning of the project, the entrepreneur has only A amount of cash at hand, so he 
has to apply for a credit of (I-A). The bank requires a revenue of Rl from the total revenue 
RI. The residual Rb revenue is the entrepreneur’s stake in the project. The bank is facing 184
perfect competition, so the ex post profit of the creditor is zero. The bank is offering credit 
at an interest rate normalized to zero, so none of the agents of the model has a preference 
on the timing of revenues. 
All participants are risk neutral, their decisions are made based only on the expected NPV 
of the different strategies. I assume that the expected NPV of the project is positive only 
if the borrower behaves, and negative otherwise even with the privet benefit of shirking. 
In the borrower’s balance sheet, there are also receivables of seize cI related to one given 
customer. The collection of these receivables is due before the end of the bank loan’s ma-
turity. At a probability of q, the borrower collects his receivables at time, where q is also 
known by both the supplier and by the bank ex ante. But the bank does not have any clear 
information on the collection ex post. If the customer defaults, the supplier’s balance 
sheet decreases to (I-cI). I assume that even the private benefit will decrease to BI(1-c) 
because it was originally defined to be proportional to the project seize.
A possible default of the customer has an influence also on the supplier’s probability of 
success. Common macroeconomic factors or industrial specialties can explain why the 
probability of success will be decreased by a multiplier of 0 < δ ≤ 1. The supplier decides 
on his efforts after the collection of his customer. 
The extensive form of the model is described in the Figure 1. The participants of the 
project are the bank, the supplier and the nature. In the later one I used the game theoreti-
cal solution to incorporate the realization of random variables to the model. The scenario 
highlighted by blue is as follows. The bank provides credit to the borrower. The customer 
of the borrower pays at time. The supplier decides to misbehave but even this low prob-
ability of success is enough for a successful project. So the final payout of the entire 
project is IR, that one of the borrower equals Rb+BI. The bank receives (I-A). 185
Figure 1.
The extensive form of the first version of the model
The model of external financing with symmetric 
information on partner risk
In the second version of the model, the borrower’s receivables are due at the end of the 
bank loan’s maturity which I explain by industrial differences compared to the first ver-
sion. So the ex post paying ability of the supplier’s customer is not only hidden for the 
bank but also for the supplier. When the borrower decides on his strategy, his decision can 
be made only on q which is the ex ante probability of customer’s successful collection 
and the chosen strategy can not be modified any more. So the borrower’s and creditor’s 
knowledge on the borrower’s customer are symmetric. 
The external form of the model is as follows in the Figure 2. The highlighted scenario 
describes that the bank provides credit to the supplier who decides to behave. At the due 
date of his receivables he collects on time the amount of cI from the customer. But even 
in this favorable situation the project finally fails. The project revenue and the revenue of 
the borrower and the creditors equals zero.186
Figure 2.
The extensive form of the second version of the model
The optimal credit contract
In the above described contract theoretical framework, I define the optimal contract for 
the participants where the borrower has a stake in the project high enough to behave but 
also the bank can achieve his target revenue.
The optimal contract in the case of informational 
asymmetry on the customer
The total revenue of the project has to satisfy the bank’s and also the borrower’s expecta-
tions. As the decision about the credit contract is made, the ex post revenue is not known 
yet, the participants can only decide based on the expected values. 
At first, let’s concentrate on the bank’s financial constraint. The creditor’s initial outlay is 
(I-A) at the beginning of the project. So he requires a revenue which will not be lower than 
(I-A). Remember, that the NPV of the project is positive only if the borrower behaves, and 187
negative otherwise. So the bank receives a repayment only in the former case. That’s the 
reason why the bank has to motivate the borrower to behave. 
As the borrower’s strategy can vary according to his customer’s default or surviving, also 
the bank has to consider both subcases which lead to a doubled financial constraint. The 
bank is acting at a perfect competitive market, so (1a) and (1b) can be reduced to equa-
tions where (1b) will be the binding constraint. 
( ) A I R IR p b H − ≥ −         ( 1 a )
[ ] A I R IR c p b H − ≥ − − ) 1 ( δ       ( 1 b )
The borrower’s incentive constraint has to assure the borrower’s high efforts. To induce 
him to behave, he has to keep a proportion of the total project revenue high enough to 
offset the BI private benefit of shirking. The contract has to incentive him also in the case 
of his customer’s default, so according to the paying ability of the customer, two subcases 
are to be defined. 
BI R p R p b L b H + ≥         ( 2 a )
) 1 ( c BI R p R p b L b H − + ≥ δ δ        ( 2 b )
Let Δp the difference of the two probabilities of success, more precisely Δp=pH-pL.  
Substituting the borrower’s incentive constraint to the bank’s financial constraint, the 
optimal contract can be described as follows. 
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Having (4a-b) technical assumptions, I restate the (3a-b) inequations in formulae (5a-b). 
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Let’s use notation I Ak i ≥  (i=1; 2) to simplify the formulae, so I can define the equity 
multipliers k1 and k2 for Case 1 and 2. 
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Analyzing the (6a-b) equations, in a model where the borrower does not have defaulting 






 as the 
parameters related to the customer take the following values: 1 = δ  and c=1. In such a 
very simple case, the maximum seize of the revenue pledged to the bank without violating 









, the second part of 
the maximum pledgeable income is a kind of agency cost which is used by the bank to 
induce the borrower. 
When the borrower can have defaulting customers, the equity multiplier is changed by the 
decreased pledgeable income. The maximum pledgeable income reduces not only be-
cause the expected revenue of the project decreases to  ) 1 ( c R pH − δ , but also because 











, is relatively lower com-
pared to the decrease of the expected revenue. 
The optimal contract in the case of informational 
symmetry on the customer
The optimal credit contract is derived also in this case from the financial constraint of the 
creditor and from the incentive constraint of the borrower. The risk neutral participants 
base their decisions again on the expected values of their future revenues. 189
The bank requires an expected revenue which is not lower than his initial outlay of (I-A). 
The creditor has to motivate the borrower to behave, but in this case the moral hazard 
related to the borrower’s decision is lower than in the former version of the model. The 
borrower chooses his strategy at the beginning of the project when a possible future de-
fault of his customer is unknown. So there is only a moral hazard related to the level of 
entrepreneur’s effort in this version of the model, but there is not any moral hazard due to 
a defaulting customer. So the participants can define their own constraints in one single 
expected value without differentiating two subcases depending on the customer’s liquid-
ity situation. The financial constraint of the bank and the incentive constraint of the bor-
rower reduces to (7) and (8) compared to the former section. 
A I R c IR p q R IR qp b H b H − ≥ − − − + − ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) (       (7)
[ ] ) 1 )( 1 ( c q q BI R p R p b L b H − − + + ≥        (8)
Using (7), (8) and the notation Δp=pH-pL, the optimal credit contract has the following 
characteristics: 
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Remembering that the NPV of the project is positive only if the borrower behaves, the 
right side of inequation (9) is composed of the I project seize and of a multiplier smaller 
than 1. Again, an additional assumption (10) is needed to finish the calculation:
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p
B
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The relationship between the borrower’s initial wealth and the project seize is as follows 
in (11a-c). In this version a single k equity multiplier can be defined using (11c):





















I Ak ≥         ( 1 1 b )
[ ] [ ]
1
















c q q R p
k
H δ   (11c)190
Here, in this version of the model the maximal pledgeable income decreases due to the 
lower expected project revenue and due to the relatively higher agency cost which is not 
affected by the macroeconomic shock δ. 
Results
In this section I analyze the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs comparing the two ver-
sions of the model. 
The equity multiplier
The optimal contract which the k1, k2 or the single k multiplier is derived from also defines 
the maximum level of the entrepreneur’s leverage. As the borrower can keep the entire 
NPV of the project – because the bank requires a revenue of only (I-A) – the entrepreneur 
is interested in a maximal project seize. Inequations (5) and (11) define the maximal seize 
of I at a given level of entrepreneur’s A initial wealth. So the optimal investment decision 
if the supplier is to invest ki (i=1; 2) or k times his initial A amount of assets where ki (i=1; 
2) or k > 1. So the entrepreneur applies for a credit of (ki –1)A (where i=1; 2) or (k-1)A to 
boost the project seize up to I. 
The higher the ki (i=1; 2) or k equity multiplier the higher the maximum seize of the proj-
ect. Disregarded from defaulting customers, a high probability of success in the case of 
the borrower’s high efforts (pH), a high project revenue per one unit of investment (R), a 
low level of private benefit of shirking (B) can increase the borrower’s borrowing capac-
ity. Also a large difference between the probabilities of success of shirking and behaving 
(Δp) can contribute to an increased leverage, because the efforts of the borrower are more 
closely related to the success of the project than at a smaller Δp. A high Δp means a higher 
probability of negative consequences in the case of shirking so the moral hazard is lower 
if the Δp is high. 
Considering also possible defaults of the borrower’s customers, the borrowing capacity 
of supplier decreases. The decrease can be measured by the difference between the equity 
multiplier in the case of q=1 – let denote this multiplier by k* - and the appropriate of k, 
k1, k2 in the case of q<1. Analysis of the formulae shows that the higher the proportion of 
the customer in the borrower’s balance sheet (c), the lower the level of accessible external 
financing. If also common macroeconomic shocks can occur or the financial stability of 
borrower is influenced by the default of his customer through the decreased probability of 
success (δ), the borrowing capacity will be even lower. 
In the first version of the model (informational asymmetry on the customer), the q prob-
ability of the collection of receivables is not part of the equity multiplier. From the theo-
retical point of view, the assumptions of the model can explain the result. The practice 
can also provide an evident explanation which harmonizes with my results. A possible 191
customer default effects the bank’s exposure on the one hand through the financial sta-
bility of the borrower which decides whether a contagion can occur or not (δ), and on 
the other hand trough the borrower’s exposure to his customer measured by c. An other 
reason why the bank is interested in these parameters is that the borrower decides on his 
strategy based on the values of c and δ. So the level of additional moral hazard related 
to the borrower’s customer is influenced only by c and δ but not by q. The estimation 
of q which could be forecasted based on the average collection period of receivables is 
often insufficient because financial statements of SME usually lack opacity not only in 
Hungary but also in more developed economies.  
According to the findings, firms with less diversified customer portfolios, depending on 
a few strategic customers, and at the same time having a long collection period of re-
ceivables can achieve a lower level of external financing than similar firms with a more 
diversified portfolio. A low level of δ can also contribute to a decreased borrowing capac-
ity disregarded from the level of c. A high dependency on timing of collections, a low 
volume of net working capital can lead to such a situation. Possible further development 
of the model could be to define δ as a function of c. 
In the case of informational symmetry on the customer, the q probability of the custom-
er’s punctual collection is also part of the results. In this version the severity (δ and c) of 
the customer’s default and also the q probability of his default can influence the equity 
multiplier. Compared to the former analysis, the c and δ has the same effects on the en-
trepreneur’s borrowing capacity and a decrease of q can also reduce the level of leverage.
The next step of my analysis is to quantify the decrease in the supplier’s borrowing capac-
ity. As a benchmark, I will use k* the maximal borrowing capacity where sales revenue 
is always collected on time (q=1). In this case my results reduce to the model of external 
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In Table 1, there are the equity multipliers for the case of informational asymmetry where 
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ing for the borrowing capacity if the entrepreneur does not have any informational advan-
tage on his customer.  All the three multipliers are defined as a function of k*, so one can 
prove that k1, k2 and k are smaller than the benchmark k* because denominators in the 
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Let’s choose the case of informational symmetry to illustrate why the borrowing capacity 
decreases compared to k*. The first part of the denominator, (k*-1)(1-q)c, is the expected 
loss of the bank due to the default of the borrower’s customer. The residual part of the 
denominator contains the expected decrease of the project’s revenue. First, the expected 
revenue per one unit of investment decreases by  ) 1 )( 1 ( q − −δ . Second, there is also a 
decrease in the expected seize of the project by  ) 1 ( c − . So these double effect of default-
ing customer is considered in the following part of k:  ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( c q R pH − − −δ .
An interesting question after comparing the k1, k2 and k borrowing capacities to k* is to 
compare the borrowing capacities of the symmetric and the asymmetric model. Having 













c , one can prove that k always provides a 
higher borrowing capacity than k1 or k2. While the model uses two subcases to define the 
constraints which the k1 and k2 are derived from, k is coming from a constraint defined by 
one single expected value. The fact, that the supplier can not modify his strategy after a 
possible default of his customer, results in a lower level of credit rationing than the other 
version of the model where the supplier - who is relatively well informed about the cus-
tomer - can renew his decision about his level of efforts. The model shows an informa-
tional paradox: the lower informational advantage of the borrower results in a higher 
borrowing capacity. This paradox can be explained by the risks generated by thy cus-
tomer. A possibly defaulting customer means by definition an explicit credit risk for the 
borrower and an implicit one also for the bank. If the value of δ is lower than one, a 
component of systematic risk occurs in the form of contagion between the two entrepre-
neurs. In the case of asymmetric information about the customer, an additional moral risk 193
is generated because he can change his strategy about the level of efforts. If the supplier 
knows relatively less about his customer, he can only take a smaller informational advan-
tage, and the bank remunerates a relatively uninformed borrower by offering a higher 
credit. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I examined the external financing of a supplier whose customers can default.
The contract theoretical framework comes from Tirole’s (2005) models on corporate fi-
nance. The customer is incorporated by three parameters to the model. The probability 
of customer’s default is (1-q), where the receivables related to this customer have a part 
c in the balance sheet of the supplier. A default of the customer or of both firms can be 
explained by a common macroeconomic shock, by δ. The δ can also describe a coefficient 
of contagion between the to firms. But disregarded from its interpretation, δ brings a 
systematic risk component to the model. If a possible default of a customer appears in the 
model of the supplier’s financing, the optimal credit contract of the supplier will change. 
The bank provides a lower level of credit that he would without the possible overdue 
receivables of his borrower.
The credit risk of the customer results in a lower project seize which decreases both the 
borrower’s NPV and the generated social wealth. The paper developed two versions of 
the model where difference of the two models was the level of informational asymmetry 
between the bank and the borrower. If there is an informational asymmetry not only about 
the efforts of the borrower but also about the customer’s credit risk, this allows the sup-
plier to modify his strategy after the due date of his receivables. The customer’s credit 
risk which can also lead to a systematic risk component generates additional moral hazard 
of the supplier. The bank, considering all the three additional risk elements, reduces the 
volume of credit which would be already rationed without any partner risk related to the 
customer. 
If the supplier has not any informational advantage on his own customer, he achieves 
a higher leverage than in the “well informed case”, what I describe as an informational 
paradox. In this version of the model, a possibly defaulting customer generates only credit 
risk and a contagion effect which the bank will be exposed to, but there is not any addi-
tional moral hazard which the supplier could take advantage from. That is the reason why 
the effect of the risky customer reduces relatively less the credit worthiness of his supplier 
than in the first version of the model.  
The results of this paper shows that the borrowing capacity of SME could be ameliorated 
if the bank has sufficient information also on the customers of his borrower. On possible 
way of having all important information also on the customer is to provide bank services 
also to the customer himself. Such an acquisition of customers is quite a common strat-
egy, several participants of the Hungarian bank market have the same practice. So the first 
empirical overview does not contradict to the theoretical results of my model. Although 
the diversification of the credit portfolio decreases if the participants of the same supply 194
chain are financed by the same bank, the level of external financing of the firms can be 
improved. So the direction of further research will be the joint financing of the supplier 
and his customer, this two neighbors in a supply chain.  
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